The impact of regulations in minimizing the detrimental effects of insider trading is unsettled.
on Insider Trading
I. Introduction
The merits of regulating insider trading have been the subject of vigorous debate in the finance literature since Manne (1966) suggested unfettered insider trading should be encouraged. The basis of the debate has been the costs and benefits of insider trading on the market as a whole. Manne (1966) and others have argued that insider trading has a beneficial effect on the price efficiency of a market and by extension the efficiency of its resource allocation and investment decision making (Kyle (1985) and Leland (1992) ). The contention from those favouring regulation however, is that insider trading damages investor confidence in the market and as such has serious effects on the stock market including increased bid ask spreads, cost of capital and market volatility in addition to reduced liquidity. While the academic debate on deregulation is still unsettled, it appears that insider trading has been accepted by most countries as a necessary evil. However, rather than the unencumbered insider trading envisioned by Manne (1966) , it has been regulated in over 80% of countries with capital markets (Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) ). The regulations seek to strike a balance between allowing insiders enough opportunity to trade to allow the market to receive the benefits of their superior pricing ability while limiting the harm to ordinary shareholders from insiders' use of confidential information. The literature to date has failed to conclusively show how successful the attempts to regulate a balance have been in controlling insider trading.
Impact of Insider Trading
The issue of insider trading has been widely addressed with much focus on the fact that insider trading is inequitable for outside investors who lack access to the same information as insiders. Numerous studies in a number of markets around the world show almost uniformly that insiders earn positive abnormal returns 1 . These profits however, are earned at the expense of uniformed investors who ultimately are those trading against insiders. Ausbel (1990) concludes that the presence of insiders' in a market causes other investors to lose confidence in the market which has flow-on-effects for market efficiency.
One of the most noticeable effects of insider trading is its influence on bid-ask spreads.
Insiders due to their access to preferential information hold a significant advantage over the rest of the market allowing them to expropriate sizeable trading profits. This poses a significant risk to other investors in the market, a risk that increases with the prevalence of insiders in the market. To counter this risk, market makers increase the bid-ask spreads to offset the expected losses from trading against insiders (Kyle (1985) , Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Copeland and Galai (1988) ). As a result, firms and markets where insider trading is pervasive are subject to increased spreads to accommodate the greater informational asymmetry risk. Chung and Charoenwong (1998) examined the impact of insider trading intensity on the bid ask spreads by comparing spreads on insider trading days to other days.
They concluded that without disclosure the market was unable to determine when an insider trades. As a result market makers maintained larger spreads for stocks were the incidence of insider trading was greater and at times of abnormally high volume to compensate for the extra information asymmetry in those companies.
The effect on spreads is compounded by the effect insider trading has on market liquidity.
Liquidity is a key determinant of bid-asks and the reduction in liquidity as a result of insider trading increases the spreads even further. Ausbel (1990) suggests that when outsiders expect to be taken advantage of, they are likely to reduce their investment in the market from the start. This contention is supported by Bernhadt, Hollifield and Hughson (1995) who argued that investors are likely to make investment decisions on the basis of the amount of information asymmetry, seeking projects with a lower risk of expropriation by insiders. They point out that this can lead to market distortions with investors selecting projects based on the risk of exploitation rather than the economic merits of projects. Fishman and Hagerty (1995) , Leland (1992) and Repullo (1999) in their theoretical models all predict a decrease in liquidity in situations where insider trading is more intense.
1 The profitability of self-reported insider transactions has been examined in the U.S. (Finnerty (1976) , Seyhun (1986) , Lakonishok and Lee (2001) ), Canada (Baesel and Stein (1979) ), Spain (Del Brio, Miguel and Perote (2002) ), Poland (Wisniewski and Bohl (2004) ), New Zealand (Eterbari, Tourani-Rad and Gilbert (2003)) and U.K. (Pope et al. (1990) , Friederich et al. (2002) ).
The reduction in liquidity can also be linked to a decrease in market depth. This lack of depth means that the market lacks the ability to soak up significant volumes of shares traded without impacting on the price due to limited demand and supply for shares. Kyle (1985 ), Leland (1992 and Repullo (1999) predict that the presence of insiders reduces the depth of the market and thereby increases the volatility that investors face. This is significant in that it increases the risk for investors that they will not be able to exit their investment or the market without facing a large financial penalty.
Insider trading has also been linked to increases in the cost of capital. This is a result of a number of factors such as the need to cover the increased transaction costs caused by the larger bid ask spreads, the increased risk of being unable to sell an investment in a timely fashion without a large financial penalty and decline in corporate governance (Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) ). This link was established empirically by Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) who examined the impact of introducing insider trading laws and the first enforcement on four proxies for the cost of capital across 103 countries. They found that a significant decrease occurred following the first successful enforcement of insider trading sanctions, although there was no significant reaction to the introduction of the laws.
Insider trading has been both theoretically and empirically shown to have serious outcomes for capital markets. Increased spreads, increased volatility and decreased liquidity all reduce the ability of the market to fulfil its function with subsequent distortions in resource allocation (Fishman and Hagerty (1992) and Khanna and Slezak (1994) ). The increased cost of capital for companies introduces further distortions, such as forcing companies to reject efficient projects. While both the harm and the beneficial effects of insider trading have been established, the impact that regulation has is still the subject some controversy.
The role of regulation
The role of regulation and laws should be to minimise the harm from insider trading. As has been argued, insider trading causes distortions in capital markets such as inefficient resource allocation, mispricing and lost opportunities for investment. However, the evidence on the efficacy of regulation in this respect is mixed. Several papers have examined the impact of changes in insider trading laws on the profitability and volume of insider trading. Jaffe (1974) analysed the impact that three major cases that occurred in the US in the 1960's had on insider trading. The author argued that the three cases all either extended the reach of the law or demonstrated the will to enforce the legislation which had not been enforced since its enactment in 1934. Interestingly, the paper was unable to find a significant decrease in profitability or volume before and after either the cases individually or collectively. Jaffe suggested that while the law changes made the regime more restrictive they were still primarily aimed at the most flagrant cases and therefore did not have a major impact. Seyhun (1992) conducted examination of the effects of legislative changes and case law during the 1980's, a period in which the SEC focused its enforcement efforts on insider trading and the penalties for the exploitation of material non-public information were increased markedly.
Looking at the profitability and volume he concluded that the regulatory changes had been ineffective in controlling insider trading. Banerjee and Ekard (2001) examine insider trading prior to mergers between 1897 and 1903 and find that the patterns and price run-ups are similar to those found prior to recent mergers. They conclude that insider trading laws have been ineffective in preventing insider trading although they do suggest this maybe the result of a growth in information specialists supplanting pure insiders.
By contrast, several recent studies have concluded that both amendments to and the introduction of insider trading laws have impacted on the market. Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) employed a sample of over 100 countries to examine the impact on the cost of capital of a countries enactment and the first successful enforcement of insider trading laws. They concluded that while the enactment of the laws did not have a significant effect, the first enforcement resulted in a marked decrease in the cost of capital regardless of the proxy used to measure it. Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2003) employed the same sample to examine the impact of insider trading on analyst following, arguing that the presence of insiders crowds out analysts resulting in reduced coverage. They concluded that for developed markets the first introduction of insider trading laws sees a significant increase in analyst following while emerging markets require the laws to be successfully enforced before any benefit materialises. This was supported at the firm-level by Gilbert, Tourani-Rad and Wisneiwski (2004) who found that even after controlling for other effects, higher firm-level insider trading resulted in fewer analysts following a company. Garfinkel (1997) 
The New Zealand Situation
The recent legislative changes to insider trading in New Zealand provide a good opportunity to add further evidence to the debate regarding the efficacy of regulations. Prior to 2002 insider trading was governed by the Securities Market Act 1988. There has been much commentary on this acts effectiveness based on anecdotal evidence. In particular, it has been argued the law was ineffective as it had failed to result in a successful prosecution despite being in effect for over a decade. This was further reinforced by several cases in the early 1990's which effectively weakened the enforcement mechanisms contained within the act 2 .
The criticism appears to be justified in two major areas, the disclosure requirements set out in the act and the enforcement regime it established.
The disclosure requirements in the act set out differing disclosure requirements based on the class of corporate insider. The problem however, was that the length of time between trade and disclosure was inversely related to the information hierarchy within in a firm as established in Seyhun (1998) . Substantial shareholders, those holding more than 5% of the voting rights, were required to disclose details of their trades within 5 working days.
Directors, on the other hand, were required to disclose their transactions only in the annual reports. This represents a minimum delay between the end of the financial year and the publication of the report of 3 months with an average delay between trade and disclosure of 9-10 months (Etebari, Tourani-Rad and Gilbert (2003) ). Executives, those identified by Seyhun (1998) as having the best access to information were not required to disclose their transactions at all. Given the finding by Chung and Charoenwong (1998) that the market is unable to detect insider trading without disclosure, the long delays reduce the informational benefits to the market from insider trading considerably. According to the model of Huddart, Hughes and Levine (2001) the lack of timely disclosure makes insider trades more profitable both over time and on a per round basis. The findings of Etebari, et al. (2003) and Gilbert et al. (2004) support this by showing that the delay in disclosure in New Zealand between directors and large blockholders allowed directors to earn significantly larger abnormal returns. It also supports the perception that the laws were ineffective in minimising the harm from insider trading.
The second major area of concern was the enforcement mechanisms set out in the law. Rather than relying on a public enforcement regime such as is employed in the US and the UK, the Securities Market Act (1988) relied on private enforcement. The company in whom the trading took place and the other party to the trade were permitted to take a suit for insider trading. This placed the burden of proof on those with the least access to the information and expertise required to establish if illegal insider trading occurred. Compounding this was the fact that only the company was able to sue for punitive damages and private individuals were only able to recover the value of loss that they personally incurred, making it uneconomical to companies to take an action against insiders under s18. In both cases the courts ruled the companies had good reason not to take the case and declined leave to force the companies to act. pursue a case. Companies have also proven reluctant to prosecute their own insiders even in high profile cases.
In response to the ineffectiveness of the previous regime, the Securities Market Amendment
Act (2002) was enacted and came into force on the 1 December 2002. This act has sort to address weaknesses in the old act with the most profound changes addressing the above deficiencies in the regulations. The new law requires that all corporate insiders; blockholders, directors and executives, disclose within 5 working days. The new act also gives the Securities Commission, the local securities watchdog, the ability to take over a company's right of action where it chooses not to sue. The combined effect of these changes should be a marked increase in the expected cost of insider trading as blatant breaches are more likely to be prosecuted and, at the same time, a reduction in the profitability of the insider trading due to the new disclosure laws.
The purpose of this paper is to examine these recent changes in insider trading legislation to see if they have had the expected impact on the market. This will also allow us to add further to the debate on the efficacy of regulations and regulatory changes in controlling insider trading and its negative implications.
We examine the average level of four variables, dividend yield, bid ask spreads, liquidity and volatility, in the pre and post change periods to determine if the law changes have minimised the influence of the negative aspects of insider trading on the market. Using a sample of 85 companies listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX) over the period 1996-2004 we examine the level of each variable in the two periods. We use a variety of testing methods including the matched pairs t-test, the Wilcoxon signed rank test, rolling regressions and fixed effect panel regressions to see if the variables experienced statistically significant changes in the expected directions. We find marked decreases over all the tests employed for the dividend yield (a proxy for cost of capital), bid ask spreads and volatility. We also see significant increases in the total value of traded shares in the post change period. The results
give support to the hypothesis that the recent changes have had a beneficial impact on the market as a whole.
The rest of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 contains information on the sample and variable construction along with the methodology employed. Section 3 presents the results of the testing while Section 4 presents the papers conclusions.
II. Sample, Variables and Methodology

Sample
The sample employed in this study was drawn from companies that were listed on the New To establish whether the change in regulation has had an impact on the market we performed an analysis of a number of microstructure aspects that have been both theoretically and empirically shown to be affected by insider trading. We examine the impact by studying these variables in two time periods, the pre-change period from January 1996 The change period was also tested separately in the panel regressions, but in results not reported was shown to not be significant.
Variables
We examine the impact of the recent law changes on four variables to see whether the recent law has minimised the harm from insider trading in the local market. The first variable we examined is the dividend yield which we use to proxy for the firm level cost of capital. As noted in a number of studies the cost of capital is difficult to determine directly (Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) , Bekaert and Harvey (2000) ). For this reason proxies have been employed to examine the impact of differing events on the cost of capital. One of the proxies suitable for a firm-level examination of the cost of capital is the dividend yield. Bekaert and Harvey (2000) provide a detailed examination of the link between the cost of capital in general pricing models and dividends, but as was noted by Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) a simple approximate way of calculating the cost of equity is simply to back it out of the constant growth dividend valuation model. They also point out that the dividend yields are easily observed and do not move much making them an excellent proxy for estimating the effect of a discrete change in the laws. Bekaert and Harvey (2000) also conclude that in the case of small samples, dividend yields are superior to the other method advocated by Henry (2000) of using realised returns as a proxy for cost of capital as returns are more variable. As a result, we employ dividend yields to examine the impact of the change in the law on the cost of capital.
We measure the dividend yield as the annualised dividend yield.
The second variable examined was the bid-ask spread (BA) defined as
This definition is similar to that Chung and Charoenwong (1998) who examined the impact of insider trading on spreads. Unlike that paper however, we use closing bid and ask prices to measure the spread. Interday prices have been used in a number of papers examining the bidask spreads (Jain (2002) and Acker, Stalker and Tonks (2002) ). Closing prices were used as they are more appropriate given the length of sample period being examined and due to the difficulty of obtaining intraday data in New Zealand. As was shown in Acker et al. (2002) , interday closing prices are a reasonable estimator of the actual spread. We use the log transformation to reduce the skewness in the spreads.
Another variable examined was liquidity. A number of papers have asserted that insider trading reduces liquidity (Kyle (1985) , Glosten and Milgrom (1985) , Copeland and Galai therefore, we would expect liquidity to improve. We measure liquidity by taking the dollar value of daily trading and dividing it by the market capitalisation to standardise the variable across companies. This measure was used by Jain (2002) and produces similar results to the average volume traded measure employed in Acker et al. (2002) and Chung and Charoenwong (1998) .
The final variable inspected is the return variance of firms. Kyle (1985) argues that the presence of insider trading reduces the depth of a market, making it less liquid and prone to greater price movements. Less insider trading should therefore imply greater market depth and more liquidity resulting in less volatility over time. We define return variance as the natural log of the variance of the midpoint of spreads of the previous 30 days. As per Jain (2002) we use the midpoints to avoid any potential bias from the bid ask bounce. As variances are expected to follow a chi-square distribution and exhibit skewness we use a log transformation to allow reliable t-statistics to be obtained.
Methodology
To determine whether the recent law changes were effective we examined the level of each of the variables in the pre and post periods. To test this we use a variety of tests including the matched pairs t-test which examines whether the difference in the yearly means are significantly different from zero. We also use the Wilcoxon signed rank test to determine whether there has been a significant change in the mean. This test was selected due to its superior power compared to other nonparametric tests, as it considers both the direction of the change as well as its relative magnitude. The test employed the difference score for matched pairs which were then ranked based on their absolute value before the sign of the difference was reaffixed. The score of the difference was then tested to determine the significance of the change. The test statistic is normally distributed for large samples. For further information on the construction and application of this test please refer to Siegel and Castellan (1988) . Rolling regressions were also conducted by computing an equally weighted cross-sectional average for the variables at each point in time. We then employed a moving-window estimation whereby the previous 100 observations of the average were regressed against a constant. This allowed the regression intercept and its confidence bounds to be plotted over time, providing a graphical representation of structural shifts in the underlying variable. This approach is the equivalent of that employed by Driffill and Sola (1998) .
Finally, we employ fixed effect panel regressions on firm-month level data of each variable against a dummy variable that equals 1 in the months following the introduction of the new laws. These regressions also include several control variables, MV, defined as the natural log of the firms market capitalisation and CROSS which is a dummy variable that equals one for each month that a firm has a cross listing on another exchange. This is used to control for firms that are subjected to the laws of another exchange and therefore may already be subjected to tighter regulations. As a robustness check we employed the F test to test the significance of group effects in each of the model specifications employed. We found uniformly that the fixed effect panel is superior compared to the restricted model. Further, the fixed model was preferred as it does not suffer from the omitted variable problem that can plague the random effect models (Hausman and Taylor (1982) and Chamerlain (1978) ). As a specification test we also re-estimate our panel regressions using an adjustment for serial correlation in the errors. We control for first-order autocorrelation which greatly improves the accuracy of the reported specifications, as measured by the Durbin-Watson statistic. The sample has also been corrected for the use of lagged data in the estimation.
III. Results
To address the effectiveness of the new laws we examined four variables that have been Table 1 gives summary statistics based on firm-month data for the variables used. The BA spread has an arithmetic average of .0768, or a spread of 7.68% of the price. This is significantly larger than the average spreads reported in the US (Chung and Charoenwong (1998) report 1.83%) or the UK (Acker et al. (2002) report 2.3%). This is likely due to the small size of the market with its resulting low liquidity. The table also shows that on average .08% of a firms' market value is traded on a daily basis with an average of 143,000 shares traded. This variable however has a large standard deviation indicating that there is a large difference between the average shares traded of the most and least liquid companies on the New Zealand market. VAR had an average of .00033, while DY had an average of .0575. The latter value is higher compared to other markets due to the tendency of NZ companies to pay out larger dividends than companies elsewhere. The average firm market capitalisation over the sample period was just NZ$ 91 million indicating that companies in New Zealand are much smaller than their counterparts in other developed markets.
Descriptive Statistics
[Insert Table 1 about here] The sample cross correlations are presented in Table 2 . Bid-ask spreads (BA) have significant negative relationships with VOL, MV, CROSS, and DY, indicating that lower spreads are associated with larger more liquid companies, as well as companies that are cross-listed on other markets. We also see lower spreads are associated with companies with higher dividend yields, likely a result of the higher rate of dividends that larger companies pay out. The positive relationship with VAR suggests that lower variance is associated with lower spreads.
VAR has negative associations with MV, and DY implying that larger companies and companies with higher dividend yields have lower volatility of returns. Finally, we also see strong relationships in the predicted directions between POST and all key variables, BA (-) DY (-) VAR (-) and VOL (+). This lends some preliminary support to the hypothesis that the changes in law have had a positive impact on the market.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Dividend Yield
Dividend yield has been used in a number of studies to examine the impact of market changes on the cost of capital. While the cost of capital is difficult to estimate papers have shown that dividend yield and cost of capital are closely related. Bekaert and Harvey (2000) discuss the theory behind this relationship and conclude that dividend yield is an easily observable and stationary variable. It, therefore, is an excellent proxy for viewing the effect of dramatic structural changes on the market. Bhattachraya and Daouk (2002) in applying this model note that it is possibly better suited to examining the effect of insider trading laws introduction than market liberalisation, the purpose of the Bekaert and Harvey (2000) study. They conclude that the major weakness of the dividend yield measure, is that the dividend growth rate must be stationary. This is more likely to be true for changes in insider trading laws as it has no real impact on the company's growth rate.
The results in Table 3 provide strong support for the hypothesis that the law change resulted in a substantial decrease in dividend yields. Panel A reports the test results of the mean level of DY before the change with the average after the change. As can be seen the average has decreased from between .055 to .0753 before the change period to just .0323 afterwards. This decrease is significant at the 1% level based on both the matched pairs t-test and the Wilcoxon signed rank tests in all periods except for 1996 where it is significant at the 5% level. It is also interesting to note that based on both the mean and the t-statistic there appears to be some preemption of the change. For the 2002 period there appears to be a decrease in the mean dividend yield with a resulting decrease in the significance of the differences between the 2002 period and the post period.
[Insert Table 3 The panel regression results presented in Table 3 Panel B also reject the hypothesis of no impact on the dividend yield from the regulatory change. The results show that the dummy variable for all months following the change period, POST, is significant at the 1% level in the four regression models employed. After controlling for autocorrelation by introducing an autoregressive term the relationship between POST and DY still remains strong. The regressions in Models 3 and 4 also include several control variables that may have impacted on the relationship. As can be seen the MV variable is also captures a significant proportion of the variation in DY while the CROSS variable is only relevant when the AR (1) 
Bid Ask Spreads
Several papers have developed theoretical models that make predictions about the effect insider trading has on the bid ask spread. Copeland and Galai (1988) , Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985) have all predicted a positive relationship between the prevalence of insider trading and the spreads that market makers set. This has also been supported by Chung and Charoenwong (1998) empirically who found that market makers, although not able to spot exactly when an insider trades, set greater spreads on firms with a greater incidence of insider trading to compensate for their losses to informed traders in the long run. The recent law changes in New Zealand should have raised the cost of insider trading and resulted in a reduction of the incidence as insiders trade less. As such and in line with both the theoretical and empirical evidence we would expect to see a significant decrease in the spreads on companies in the New Zealand market.
[Insert Table 4 about here] Table 4 presents the panel regression results for the spreads. The coefficient estimates also support the belief that there has been a decrease in the spreads following the introduction of the new laws. The POST variable is significant in all specifications at the 1% level. MV has a very strong association with the spreads in all the models supporting the cross correlations presented in Table 2 . Again the results show that CROSS is only relevant when the AR(1) term is excluded. The same is true of the VAR and VOL measures which were included to control for the liquidity and volatility determinants of the spreads. Both these variables are important before the model is adjusted to account for serial correlation of the residuals although they do appear to have an effect due to the much reduced significance level when both they and the AR(1) term are included together. Again the adjusted R 2 suggests that the models fit the data well. The results therefore all point to a significant decrease in the spreads following the regulatory amendments.
Liquidity
Ausbel (1990) built on the earlier models of insider trading by trying to quantify the impact of insider trading on investor confidence. One of the conclusions she makes, in line with the models of Kyle (1985) Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Copeland and Galai (1988) , is that loss of investor confidence impacts negatively on the liquidity in a market. Investors feeling uncertain about their prospects of getting a fair deal are put off the market and reduce their investment in the market. This finding was also supported by the model of Fishman and Hagerty (1995) who concluded that insider trading harms outsiders which results in investors withdrawing from the market. As discussed above, the new laws should result in less insider trading as they trade only when their information will compensate for the increased cost of insider trading. As a result the liquidity of the sample firms should increase following the new laws introduction.
Panel A of Table 5 presents the results for liquidity. As can be seen the results strongly support an increase in liquidity following the introduction of the Securities Market Amendment Act 2002. The average of the sample has increased from around .08% of the firms value traded per day, to .12%, a marked increase and nearly double the change period.
The increase in liquidity is also significant across the board at the 5% level or better in all years. The only exception to this is the Wilcoxon signed rank test value for 1996 which has a p-value of .11. The rolling regressions in Figure 3 again strongly support this finding with an almost immediate increase following the introduction of the new law to a higher level than is observed at any point in the pre change period. The increase is relatively sharp with the new level being reached by June 2003.
[Insert Table 5 about here] Panel B Table 5 also provides evidence to support the notion that the legislative changes have had an impact on insider trading. In all four model specifications the POST variable is positive and significant at the 1% level. Due to the use of market capitalisation as a denominator in the construction of the liquidity variable, MV was excluded from the regressions to avoid spurious relationships induced by the variable construction. We include BA instead due to the impact that spreads have on liquidity. The results show that CROSS somewhat surprisingly has no impact on the volume traded, although BA is significant in both Models 3 and 4, although only at the 10% level in Model 4. The adjusted R 2 shows that while the models are not as strong as those for dividend yield and bid ask spread, the model does appear to explain a reasonable amount of the variation in the liquidity. The results overall provide strong evidence that liquidity in the sample firms increased in the period following the introduction of the new insider trading laws.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
Volatility
The final measure examined is volatility. Kyle (1985) argued that insider trading reduced the depth of a market making stocks more prone to price shocks and increased volatility.
Therefore, another sign of an improvement in the market brought about by a reduction in insider trading would be a significant decrease in the volatility of the market.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Panel A of Table 6 presents the mean volatility before and after the law change. The results support the belief that the volatility of shares has decreased compared with all years except 1996. While 1996 for both the t-test and the Wilcoxon signed rank test is insignificant, every other year is significant, in all but 1997 at the 1% level. There also appears to be a similar preemption to that observed in the dividend yield with the mean for 2002 being larger than those in the pre change period and the significance down to the 10% level for the t-test. The pattern depicted in Figure 4 is also consistent with the decrease in volatility occurring during a u shape dip in volatility that climbs back up before the date the new regime came into effect.
Once the new law is enacted there is a significant and sharp decrease in the volatility.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
The panel regressions in Panel B of Table 6 also provide firm support for the impact of regulatory change. There is a strong negative association between VOL and POST. The relationship does however weaken when serial correlation in the errors is controlled for. The results also show that the negative and significant relationship between VAR and MV disappears when the autoregressive term is included. This is in contrast to dividend yields and the spreads where the MV retained its significance. The results also show no connection between volatility and CROSS which supports the cross correlations presented in Table 2 .
Again the model specifications used result in strong R 2 values with values between .46 and .68, suggesting that the models are explaining a sizeable portion of the variation in the volatility in the sample. The results as a whole suggest that volatility has decreased with the introduction of the new laws.
The results for all four measures show strong support for the contention that the introduction of the new law has resulted in a marked change in the structure of the market. Dividend yields, bid ask spreads and volatility have all seen substantial decreases in the average level since the change in regulations while the liquidity has significantly increased. For all measures the change can be shown to have occurred on or very soon after the change in the laws supporting the view that the structural change has occurred as a result of the change in the insider trading laws. The results also show that even controlling for other known determinants of the measures employed the dummy variable for the post change period,
POST, is significant in all cases, at the 1% level in most model specifications. The models used also show high R 2 values especially for the dividend yield and bid ask spreads suggesting an extremely good fit. The new laws appear to have been effective in increasing the cost of insider trading and lowering its incidence and therefore the harm that it causes to the market microstructure.
IV. Conclusions
This paper set out to examine whether the new insider trading laws in New Zealand have resulted in the expected improvements in the market as a result of the hypothesised reduction in the incidence of insider trading. This was achieved by comparing four variables that have been shown to be impacted by insider trading. The variables examined were the dividend yield which was used to proxy for the cost of capital, the natural log of the bid-ask spread, While the results show a significant improvement, they provide no insight into whether the current legal structure is the most effective one available. Note: BA defined as the natural log of the monthly average of the daily ask price minus the bid price divided by the midpoint of the spreads. VOL represents the firm's liquidity defined as the monthly average of the daily dollar value of trading divided by the market value of the company. MV is the natural log of the firms market capitalization averaged for the calendar month. VAR represents the return volatility of the firm defined as the natural log of the variance of returns over the period -30,0, averaged over each calendar month. DY is defined as the monthly average of the annualised dividend yield. MV is the log of the firms market capitalization averaged for the calendar month. Note: p-values are in parentheses. BA defined as the natural log of the monthly average of the daily ask price minus the bid price divided by the midpoint of the spreads. VOL represents the firms liquidity defined as the monthly average of the daily dollar value of trading divided by the market value of the company. VAR represents the return volatility of the firm and is defined as the natural log of the variance of returns over the period -30,0, averaged over each calendar month. MV is the natural log of the firms market capitalization averaged for the calendar month. . CROSS is a dummy variable that equals 1 for those months in which a firm is cross-listed on another exchange. POST is a dummy variable that equals 1 for all firm-months from December 2002 onwards. DY is defined as the monthly average of the annualised dividend yield. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The sample consists of 8330 firm months observations. All yearly means were calculated as calendar years with the exception of the post change period where the sample ran from April 2003 to March 2004. T-Stats were calculated using the matched pairs t-test. The dependent variable in all models is DY defined as the monthly average of the annualised dividend yield. Post is a dummy variable that equals 1 for firm months after December 2002, the time of the regulatory change. MV is the natural log of the firms market capitalization averaged for the calendar month. CROSS is a dummy variable that equals 1 for those months in which a firm is cross-listed on another exchange. AR(1) is an autoregressive term where the coefficient is fixed across cross-sectional units. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The sample consists of 8330 firm months observations. All yearly means were calculated as calendar years with the exception of the post change period where the sample ran from April 2003 to March 2004. T-Stats were calculated using the matched pairs t-test. The dependent variable in all models is BA defined as the natural log of the monthly average of the daily ask price minus the bid price divided by the midpoint of the spreads. Post is a dummy variable that equals 1 for firm months after December 2002, the time of the regulatory change. MV is the natural log of the firms market capitalization averaged for the calendar month. CROSS is a dummy variable that equals 1 for those months in which a firm is cross-listed on another exchange. VAR represents the return volatility of the firm and is defined as the natural log of the variance of returns over the period -30,0, averaged over each calendar month. VOL represents the firms liquidity and is defined as the monthly average of the daily dollar value of trading divided by the market value of the company. AR(1) is an autoregressive term where the coefficient is fixed across cross-sectional units. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The sample consists of 8330 firm months observations. All yearly means were calculated as calendar years with the exception of the post change period where the sample ran from April 2003 to March 2004. T-Stats were calculated using the matched pairs t-test. The dependent variable in all models is VOL defined as the monthly average of the daily dollar value of trading divided by the market value of the company. Post is a dummy variable that equals 1 for firm months after December 2002, the time of the regulatory change. CROSS is a dummy variable that equals 1 for those months in which a firm is cross-listed on another exchange. BA defined as the natural log of the monthly average of the daily ask price minus the bid price divided by the midpoint of the spreads AR(1) is an autoregressive term where the coefficient is fixed across cross-sectional units. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The sample consists of 8330 firm months observations. All yearly means were calculated as calendar years with the exception of the post change period where the sample ran from April 2003 to March 2004. T-Stats were calculated using the matched pairs t-test. The dependent variable in all models is VAR defined as the natural log of the variance of returns over the period -30,0, averaged over each calendar month. Post is a dummy variable that equals 1 for firm months after December 2002, the time of the regulatory change. MV is the natural log of the firms market capitalization averaged for the calendar month. CROSS is a dummy variable that equals 1 for those months in which a firm is cross-listed on another exchange. AR(1) is an autoregressive term where the coefficient is fixed across cross-sectional units. Note-The vertical axis represents the estimate from a regression run on the previous 100 daily dividend yield averaged over 85 companies against a constant. The dividend yield is defined as the annualised dividend yield. The vertical line represents the date the new legislation came into force. Note-The vertical axis represents the estimate from a regression run on the previous 100 daily liquidity averaged over 85 companies against a constant. The liquidity is defined as the dollar value of trading divided by the current market capitalisation. The vertical line represents the date the new legislation came into force. 
